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Abstract 
This paper will show how we could ameliorate the quality of public policies and programmes 
monitoring and on going evaluations by using established outranking methods and Electre 
software assistance.. 
The craftiness is to take the outcomes of programmes for each period and to elaborate the 
outcomes multidimensional profile, and then to compare these profiles year after year without 
having the need to calculate and to observe the evolution of the corresponding synthetic 
impact index.  
This article outlines all of the net advantages of comparing annual outcomes profiles rather 
than the evolution of theaggregatei index. We aim to show that the outcomes profiles can be 
compared by the same outranking methods as those used in the case of several options or 
projects compared during the same year. The well-known Electre software assistance is used. 
 Key-words: multicriteria evaluation, fuzzy integral, outranking method, impact 
indexes, public policies and programs outcomes profiles. 
Introduction 
In all the impact evaluations, assessment of the impact of the public action leads unavoidably 
to a need of impact synthetic indexes. So, impact indexes are fashion.  
But they are very expensive and their Confidence Ratio is generally weak. This article begins 
with a preliminary question: is the measurement of a public program impact by a synthetic 
index relevant and fiable?  Our questioning is based on two critiques of this need to have 
synthetical impact indicators for an “on going process of Monitoring and Evaluation”.  
The first critique is that many too synthetic indicators describe an evolution of structural 
changes and not an evolution of outcomes directly imputable to a public policy. Two good 
examples of such data are the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the Human Development 
Index (HDI). The evolution of these “descriptors” do not strictly reveal the real outcomes of 
public policy. They are synthetic indicators that reveal the impact of the evolution of 
numerous causal factors (for example added value, monetary income, the state of health) that 
roughly reflect general contexts or structural evolutions, which can themselves be the 
outcome of many changes, changes in private behaviour for example. The evolution of a too 
synthetic index contains the partial effects of new public policies but the observed impact is 
not strictly imputable to one factor, the public program. The evolution of the index can only 
be initially interpreted at the systemic level because they are the outcomes of private human 
action as well as public policy effects and structural trend is present. Therefore, we cannot 
deduce that such proxies are useful to accurately measure the pure effects of the 
implementations of public policy and their societal and final impact or consequences. This 
open the door to examine less synthetic effects and more multidimensional data in order to get 
more strictly imputable effects of a public program. 
The second critique applies to the technical construction of this combination of indicators.  
The method of aggregation is generally very simple: all the outcomes are given a value based 
on the same scale, a single criterion of synthesis (that is monetarization of effects, for example 
Euros). And then, one often uses a simple weighted arithmetic average. There are however, 
many critics which set themselves against this composition law which is used by many 
official organisations when aggregating indicators.  
The second critique applies to the technical construction of this combination of indicators.  
The method is very simply based:   all the outcomes are given a value based on the same scale 
that has a single criterion of synthesis (for example euros, in the case of monetization). Why 
have these synthetic indexes at all? For an historical index (or when we speak about 
evolutions), one often uses a simple weighted arithmetic average. There are however, many 
critics whichset set themselves against this composition law which is used by many official 
organisations to aggregate indicators (Marchant and al, 2003). 
The critics appear to confirm the dissatisfaction caused by over-synthesised data such as the 
GDP and the HDI (Perret, 2002) , or, in a slightly different way, the dissatisfaction provided 
by a general ranking (as in the case of the Shanghai University’s ranking of Universities 
around the world). Indeed, the use of a weighted arithmetic average based on just a single 
synthetic criterion is asking a great deal and the solutions are often weak in responding to the 
problems met. Moreover this application requires that one respects three principals: 
independence of the criteria to avoid counting the same evolution twice; normalization of the 
scales in order to join evolutions; the infinite compensation or substitution between criteria to 
combine them.  
From these observations and difficulties that are well identified in currently available 
literature (Baslé, 2008), we ask if it is possible to suggest a methodology more appropriate to 
the monitoring of Ongoing Evaluations of public policy outcomes issues. To show that there 
are better ways than by the synthetic index of an impact, we suggest coming back to the 
multicriteria evaluation methods (Bell and al, 1994)  and to see how they give an opportunity 
to compare outcome profiles.  
To show that there are better ways to take readings other than by the synthetic index of an 
impact, we suggest to come back to the multicriteria evaluation methods (Bell and al, 1994)   ) 
and to see how they could give an opportunity to compare direct, disaggregated and 
multridimensional outcomes profiles.  
Multicriteria evaluations usually compare, in ex ante evaluations, options or projects relative 
to a potential or expected net return or outcomes in several dimensions of outcomes. Then, the 
work of outranking in multicriteria decision aid is to compare each outcome in its dimension, 
not to produce a comprehensive ranking.  
Here, the main intention is to take the outcomes of a policy and its programmes for each 
period, to create the annual profile and to compare these annual profiles year on year without 
having to calculate a composite index of synthetic impact. We aim to show that these profiles 
comparisons can be realized by the same outranking methods as those used in the case of 
several options or projects compared during the same year.  
This article will by the way demonstrate the superiority of comparing profiles in this way, 
which are therefore less synthetic. It outlines all of the net advantages of comparing less 
aggregated outcome profiles when the decision-maker’s problem is traditionally to build 
composite indicators using outranking methods (ELECTRE). 
We will show that the comparison of outcome profiles tells us a lot about the outranking of 
options, and furthermore, we suggest that outcome indices at different periods can be 
considered as so many options (which are temporal series rendered as a single moment in 
time). Each period is graded according to different criteria. We refer to well-known 
outranking methods to compare evolutions of outcome profiles. This is often more than 
sufficient for the final deliberation, which will be about the progress or the stagnation of the 
overall trajectory. In this way, the method consists of comparing longer periods and less 
aggregation is required at the beginning. 
We will demonstrate two points. Firstly, the superiority of comparing multicriteria profiles 
in a single synthetic impact index. Secondly, that this method of comparing profiles can be 
applied to the analysis of evolutions of outcomes over time. Each annual outcome profile can 
be considered as an option. The temporal series of the profiles, thanks to the multicriteria 
evaluation, replaces the evolution of the synthetic impact index. By way of application, we 
show that it is possible to use decision aid tools such as ELECTRE in an Ongoing Evaluation 
to build a monitoring composite index of the impact of a public policy. With our methods, an 
algorithm or a fuzzy integral is not required in the first instance, as comparisons of profiles in 
time give an overview of the trajectory of outcomes or criteria and an overview of the 
progress (or the stagnation) of the effects of the public policy. 
Note that our proposition with regard to Guitouni and Martel’s paper (Guitouni and Martel, 
1998) . takes place upstream and downstream of this multicriteria decision aid process. 
Upstream, it establishes a new methodology that does not require the comparison of ex-ante 
options but allows for the gathering of multidimensional data for monitoring and Ongoing 
Evaluation. Downstream, because the method creates the ability to better compare outcome 
profiles. This opens the door to the design of better recommendations. 
1. Why do we generally use synthetic indices to monitor and 
evaluate public policies and programmes ? 
It is essential for good Governance to have relevant public laws to regularly maintain their 
development and regulation (Kaufmann and al, 2008) . In a knowledge-based society, 
evaluations and assessments of the effects of public policies have an increasing place (Baslé, 
2008). To produce useful metrics to aid in public policy decision making, legislative 
assemblies and administrators at both State government and local authority level draw up and 
send out calls for proposals to the scientific and expert community. The purpose of the terms 
of references of these calls is to formulate the key evaluation questions. Proposals should 
answer and the deliverables should contain assessment and recommendations. 
In order to prove the socio-economic utility of public policies and programmes, the most 
relevant proposals use and develop intensive use of lessons from “Science and Public Policy” 
(See for example the Science and Public Policy Review, ISSN 0302-3427, Online ISSN: 
1471-5430). The case of Regional authorities in France is representative of the increasing 
need for proofs for the efficacy of their policies.  
One way of helping them to do this is by using cost-benefit analyses which can then be 
integrated into other works and programmes that have been outlined and based upon 
specifications laid down by these regional authorities. However, there are many other new 
methodologies and tools for monitoring and evaluating activities. 
Development of evaluation activities induces learning and increases the quality of the 
evaluation reports (Baslé M., 2008). Now it is more and more important to predict and 
sometimes to measure, the local impact of public policies and programmes and maybe also 
the systemic impact with a good Confidence Ratio.  
The goal of Ongoing Evaluations is in part to measure or evaluate outcomes attributable to 
real public programmes realisations in known contexts (Realistic Evaluation with the model 
Context-Mechanisms-Outcomes). These outcomes have to be summarized in all their various 
dimensions and not just financially. Indicators used in the monitoring and evaluation of these 
outcomes are therefore numerous and very often simplified by the construction of a synthetic 
one.  
Recall that we are interested in the systemic impact, i.e. direct and indirect effects of the 
program and in the temporal evolution of the impact index, i.e. the evolution of a synthetic 
indicator obtained by using a composite law (either fuzzy integrals or algorithms) to compose 
with the diffrent outcome indicators. 
For each given moment over the life of a programme, impact is defined by a single 
combination of consequences outcoming from its implementations (which have to be 
differenciated from the planned or intended actions). Implementations and outcomes 
constitute the “value chain” of the deliverables of the activity of public services. 
The causal or logic based value chain is drawn up by linking (with a causal link) 
implementations and outcomes produced by the public policy. It is an essential step of the 
methodology. To do this, evaluators use a IOI Diagram (Implementations-Outcomes-
Impacts). This IOI is a well-known tool for modelling the process of monitoring and 
evaluating. It allows us to visualize the logic of service interventions with a diagram 
composed of action plans, implementations (which are engendered with human and financial 
costs), outcomes and impacts. 
Figure 1 : IOI Diagram (Implementation-Outcomes-Impact) 
Implementations and their outcomes can be closely evaluated. In other words, it is possible to 
define one or several indicators which illustrate and measure the nature and intensity of the 
outcomes. These indicators are generally stored on a scoreboard and constitute the basic 
information in different value dimensions that we need to build a synthetic index i.e. as an 
impact is a composition of outcomes, the index of this impact is by definition a composition 
of indicators of these outcomes. To measure the impact, evaluators usually decide to apply a 
composition law on the outcomes indicators. The impact is the synthesis of the 
multidimensional outcomes in the long-term. 
2. Multicriteria analysis methods: comparing options or 
programmes with one unique synthesis criterion or operate a 
multicriteria outranking of temporal and multidimensional 
outcomes i.e. profiles. 
2.1. The decision matrix 
In multicriteria literature, a decision aid helps decision-makers to make a choice between 
different options. All of these methods rely, in the first instance, upon the creation of a 
decision matrix. The decision matrix describes in rows, the different options; and in columns, 
the different criteria, which allows for the assessment of these options. In this way, we can 
look up grades for each option relative to each criterion. 
2.2. Single synthetic criterion or comparison of profiles 
Methods of multicriteria analysis generally fall into two distinct operational approaches in 
order to obtain a ranking between two options: single synthetic criterion and outranking of 
profiles. The first approach synthesises the decision matrix by building a global grade for each 
option and then comparing these global grades; the second makes a pair wise comparison, 
criterion by criterion, comparing them over a long time period and postponing the aggregative 
judgement for as long as possible. 
The most renowned method of the “unique synthesis criterion” approach requires the use of a 
weighted arithmetic average. This method is particularly favoured by international organisms 
as the PNUD. However, there are many advantages that speak in favour of the second 
approach: the comparison of profiles. 
Some of these advantages are linked to the composition law used, which is a voting rule. Each 
criterion can be considered as a judge (Roy and Bouyssou, 1993), whereby each judge 
supports one criterion. Each judge (or criterion) then votes for his preferred option. Thus, 
outranking methods are an election process for the best option as considered by different 
judges. To specify the multicriteria social choice, judges have to deliberate on the outranking 
of the options. In this way, we use a voting rule often linked to the notion of majority rule. 
Using this process allows us to reasonably aggregate the different preferences expressed by 
different criteria (or judges).The election process itself consists in putting forward a simple 
hypothesis of preference on the comparison between two options. For example where a and b 
are two options; an hypothesis of preference can be “option b is at least as good as option a”. 
Let us say that some judges (or criteria) have classified option b as being at least as good as 
option a. This set of judges constitutes a coalition. It is now possible to establish this as a 
voting rule when conducting the synthesis. This type of voting rule is qualified as a 
‘majority’: any option b will now actually be preferred over option a, if the coalition of judges 
respond to this specific voting rule. One has to bear in mind that the value used for the 
indifference threshold when using this type of voting rule can have a significant effect upon 
the outcomes. Moreover, if no weighting is defined, then the number of judges is equal to the 
number of criteria on which the options are judged. If a weighting function is applied, this has 
the effect of artificially increasing the number of judges of each criterion. 
Methods based on voting rules allow for the addition of veto thresholds. The role of these veto 
thresholds is to limit the over compensation between criteria. If an option graded by a 
criterion  falls below the veto threshold, then this criterion overrides the vote.  
3. Using comparisons of profiles to monitor an Ongoing 
Evaluation 
Our proposition consists of establishing a transformation of the “impact matrix” of an 
Ongoing Evaluation into a “decision matrix” that monitors profiles of outcomes directly 
attributable to real implementations. In other words, our proposition considers the different 
periods of evaluation of outcomes of action plans as so many “options”. The temporal 
evaluation uses static option comparisons, which give an a-temporal specificity to the 
comparisons of options. The same programme remains unchanged, but its outcomes, ex-post, 
are considered as options. 
To appreciate the possible improvements of the different outcomes of the policy, we use 
profile comparisons over different periods. In the same way that ranking options outcomes in 
a composition law, ranking outcome profiles over each period outcomes in a composition law 
that assesses indicators by each outcome. 
The effectiveness of this lemma can be demonstrated as follows. Let us consider a 
policy that has been defined by a set of actions. For reasons of monitoring and evaluation, 
outcomes produced by this action plan are tracked over several years. The goal is to identify 
whether the evolution of the policy, year on year, is good, not so good or bad.  As mentioned 
earlier, rows of the decision matrix contain grades of one option on each criterion in a 
decision aid context.  In the temporal monitoring of a policy case, these rows will correspond 
to an action plan a , over different years denoted by it   ; let  nttt aaaA  ,...,, 1  be the set 
of  action plans. Let us suppose that some outcomes have been chosen to assess these action 
plans. Let us assume that a set of indicators directly attributable to these outcomes have been 
defined for evaluating each period. Let n be the number of indicators with 2n . Let 
jg  be 
an indicator for the period j where j=1 to n. Let  nggF ,...,1  be the set of indicators. The 
outcoming table contains the grades of the action plan denoted )( itj ag   of the year 
considered.  
Figure 2 : Decision Matrix 
The implementation of a composition law on these grades allows for the determination 
as to whether action plan ita   has a better profile than action plan 1ita . In other words, it can 
be determined if the evolution of the policy or program has been positive or negative. 
It is now possible to apply the methodology, as defined by international organisations, 
upon this decision matrix in a monitoring context. After scales have been normalized, each 
period will be graded by the application of a weighted arithmetic average on the marginal 
assessment for each outcome. 
 




n
k
k
innii
i
w
agwagwagw
aN
1
2211 )(...)()(  
These different grades can be compared to allow for the ranking of different periods 
and to obtain a formalization of the evolution of an achievement of a policy or programme. As 
with all decision criteria, the arithmetic average does not merely introduce information into 
preferences, it also models them(Bouyssou and al, 2006) . Using an arithmetic average 
notifies the decision maker that a “full compensation” exists between the outcomes: one unit 
of a outcome completely offsets the unit of another outcome. Moreover, the weighted function 
(which is often presented as the outcome of a strong policy choice) depends on the kind of 
normalization chosen and on the evolution of the data in time. Moreover, whilst the 
application of this method is simple, defining its parameters is not so easy and reveals strong 
constraints that subject the decision maker into adapting his preferences to that of the model. 
3.1. Using ELECTRE methods in programme monitoring 
To establish the monitoring of action plans with inter-temporal outcome profiles, we 
suggest referring to other decision criteria that call for voting systems. These methods are well 
known under the term of “outranking methods”.  There are three methods that can be used: 
ELECTRE II, ELECTRE III and ELECTRE IV (Roy and al, 1993). These three methods are 
most often used (André and Roy, 2007)  because their algorithms have already been created 
and are present in several computer applications. 
How to make a choice between these three methods? As with the weighted arithmetic 
average, the technical choices are more often strongly political ones. Remember that the 
principle of these methods is to fix a voting rule to determine the social choice: that period b 
will actually be preferred to the period a if the coalition of judges (or outcomes) consider 
“period b is at least as good as the period a” in response to a specific voting rule. 
1. When the goal of an actual policy is to reach many objectives, they evolve in systems 
with several dimensions which are not always substitutable. For example, the concept of 
sustainable development itself lays down a parallel evolution of economic, environmental 
and social dimensions in order to reach a durable objective. To accept a perfect 
substitutability between these dimensions can be considered as a renunciation of the 
concept itself. When a decision-maker wishes to strictly apply this principle, one must 
find a solution that avoids infinite compensation. The three methods suggest using veto 
thresholds and their role is to limit the compensation effect. Let 
jv denote the veto 
threshold of the indicator 
jg . If the difference between the grade of period a  and the 
grade of period 'a  denoted ),'( aaj  (Dias and al, 2010) is higher than jv  such as 
jj vaa  ),'( , then the criterion overrides the vote and disallows the implementation of a 
probable preference. 
2. The definition of weights can sometimes pose ethical or policy questions for decisional 
authorities. Increasing the weight on one criterion (or indicator) artificially increases the 
weight of the preferences of this indicator. Not implementing weights is a possible 
solution when interest conflicts occur. Should this be the case, the ELECTRE IV method 
can be used. 
3. Denote jg an indicator and a  and 'a  two periods. Two cases are possible. In the first 
case, the “preference relation” between periods a  and 'a  expressed by jg  is a binary 
relation (a is preferred to a’ denoted 'aaPj , or a’ is preferred to a denoted aPa j' ). If the 
set of indicators have this type of preference, then ELECTRE II has to be used. 
4. In the second case the outcome indicators reveal a degree of uncertainty that is somewhat 
important. In response to this slight degree of uncertainty thrown up by the indicators, it 
might be preferable to only establish a preference if the differences between grades on 
each indicator have reached a certain level. In this way official authorities can make the 
proviso that a differential of preferences between two periods a  and 'a  is too marginal to 
constitute the revelation of a preference. Let ),'( aaj  denote the advantage of the period 
a  compared to the period 'a  (Dias and al, 2010). This advantage can be defined as 
follows:  
 
To proceed from a binary system of preferences to a progressive one, two thresholds are 
usually employed: an indifference threshold denoted 
jq , and a preference threshold 
denoted 
jp , such that 0 jj qp . These thresholds are associated with each indicator 
jg . Their value can be interpreted as follows: 
 jj qaa  ),'(  represents a non-significant advantage of the period a  over the 
period 'a . This means that the action plan at period 'a  has had no more effect than at  
period a , as measured by indicator jg . In other words, the relation between the 
period a  and the period 'a  is indifferent, denoted by 'aaI j . 
 jj paa  ),'(  represents a significant advantage of the period a  over the period 'a . 
This means that the action plan at the period 'a  has had more effect than at the period 
a , as measured by indicator jg . In other words, the relation between the period a  
and the period 'a  is preferred, denoted by 'aaPj . 
 jjj paaq  ),'(  represents an ambiguous outcome. That is to say, the advantage 
of the action plan over the period a  is not significant enough to conclude a relation of 
strict preference in favour of a , and too significant to conclude a relation of 
indifference between the periods a  and 'a . This means that the decision-maker 
cannot decide between preference and indifference. This situation is defined by a 
weak preference in favour of the period a . This specific relation of preference is 
denoted by 'aaQj . 
5. Finally, in an example, let us consider wages as an indicator denoted by sg . If the policy 
choice has an outcome indicator with a semantic type “Wages have increased”, then 
constants will be sufficient to define thresholds. Now let us consider the policy choice as 
an impact with a semantic type “evolution of the economic dimension of the welfare”. If 
the based wage )( 0ag s is low, a little positive variation of the wage between the two 
periods 0a  and 1a could be considered sufficient enough to conclude a preferred relation 
(
01 aPa j ). Contrarily, the higher the based wage, the more  positive the variation will have 
to be to conclude in an improvement of the economic welfare. In practice, outranking 
methods make the implementation of variable thresholds possible. When two periods 0a  
and 1a  are compared, the higher the based wage )( 0ag s  is, the greater the difference 
   01 agag ss   will have to be to obtain a preference such as 01 aPa j . Bear in mind that 
the concordance index is equal to zero if, and only if, the difference between the grades of 
1a  and 0a are greater than the concordance threshold such 
as )()(0),( 0110 agagpaac jsss  , therefore as the value of )( 0ag s  increases, the 
higher the concordance threshold sp will have to be. We can determine this with the 
following function ))(( agpf ss  such as 0
)(

adg
df
j
. 
Once the method has been chosen and the parameters have been defined, the algorithm 
is run on the decision matrix (Maystre and al, 1994) ). 
3.2. Using the ELECTRE TRI method 
Whilst awaiting the completion of a policy implementation, a decision-maker can plan 
intermediate objectives in order to be sure that it reaches its long-term objectives. A decision-
maker may wish to build an indicator that is capable of determining if the public policy has an 
evolution that is complying with predictions. An Index can be described as a division between 
the measure of a synthetic index and its goal. This type of measure is easier when both the 
synthetic index and the goal are numbers. However, in several cases, it is not possible to find 
a relevant composition law to build a global grade for the impact being considered, and so 
define a goal. Instead of fixing just one goal for the impact, one solution is to fix one goal for 
each outcome indicator and to compare, by outcome, the level of each indicator and the level 
of the goal with which it is associated and then to compare the outcome profiles. 
Once more, the implementation of outranking methods presents a good alternative to 
the problem affecting the options of categories. Each category tC  is delimited by two targeted 
profiles arbitrarily defined by politics and denoted by 
th  and 1th . These profiles are defined 
by a vector of goals denoted ))();...;(( 1111   tntt hghgV . In the ELECTRE TRI method, the 
outranking relation is build in order to enable the comparison of an alternative a to a profile 
th . This outranking relation is build through the following steps:  
 compute the partial concordance indices  tj hac ,  and  ahc tj , ;  
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 compute the global concordance indices  thac , ;  
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 compute the partial discordance indices  tj had ,  and  ahd tj , ; 
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 compute the fuzzy outranking relation grounded on the credibility 
indices  tha, ;  
   
 
  


Fj t
tj
tt
hac
had
hacha
,1
,1
.,,  with     ttj hachadFjF ,,/   
 and determine a  -cut of the fuzzy relation in order to obtain a crisp 
outranking relation. 
The cutting level   is consider as the smallest value of the credibility index compatible with 
the assertion “ a outrank th ”, i.e.,   tt aShha  , . We define the binary relations 
 (preference), I (indifference), R (incomparability) as following: tt aShaIh  and Saht ; 
tt aShha  and not Saht ; tha  not taSh and Saht  ; taRh not taSh and not Saht . 
Figure 3 : Decision matrix 
At the commencement of the policy 0t , if 1a  is judged by the criteria at least as 
good as 0a , then the policy is considered as being efficient. This means that the targeted 
profile 1h  is not arbitrarily defined but is the vector of the grades of the action plan of period 
0a  and we can denote that with ))();...;(( 0011 agagV n . In other words, 1a will have to 
belong to the category 1C . If 1a  belongs to the category 0C , then the policy will  not reach its 
goals. In the same way for the period  2a , if 2a is judged by criteria at least as good as the 
targeted profile 2h . That means that the targeted profile 2h  is a vector of grades defined as 
follows: ))();...;(( 2212 hghgV n . If 2a  belongs to the category 2C delimited by 1h  and 2h , 
then the policy will be considered as being efficient. On the other hand, if 2a  belongs to the 
category 1C , then the policy will not reach its goals. 
Figure 4 : Schematization of the decision matrix with ELECTRE TRI 
The comparison of outcome profiles becomes a navigational tool whereby long-term 
objectives can be reached by continually monitoring the evolution of the policy.  
Figure 5 : Links between outranking methods and synthetic indicators 
Conclusion 
Usually, in the evaluation of public policies and programmes, the goal is to measure 
outcomes in different dimensions. These outcomes are considered (by convention or after a 
causality test) as directly attributable to realisations and implementation of the programmes. 
Evaluators often want a formula for assessment of a more systemic impact (direct and indirect 
effects of programmes). The impact index is synthetic and follows composition laws that are 
built on the basis of arithmetical mean or very complex fuzzy integrals. 
We have proposed to exclude the calculation of a synthetic index. The different 
outcomes of each year constitute a profil of results. For comparing the profiles and their 
temporal evalution, a decision matrix is used in conjunction with multicriteria analyses. We 
can then use an outranking method on this decision matrix. In this way, we have no need to 
use integrals and synthetic index. Instead we can happily use a pair wise comparison to obtain 
a ranking. We have shown that it is possible with ELECTRE software assistance to implement 
these methods on monitoring and evaluation problems when the need takes the shape of 
making a synthetic scoreboard. Our future work will concentrate on real life applications.  
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